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BUREAUCRACY, BAMAKO and BASIC HEALTH SERVICES:
Reflections on Community Participation and National Programmes
By Reginald Herbold Green
We must look our mistakes
squarely in the face,
lest we fall into repeating them.
- Rui Balthasar Santos
Rector Eduardo Mondlane University
Introduction
Community participation, user charges, universal access to basic health 
care, liberalisation, better governance, prioritisation are all slogans or 
themes frequently referred to, and bowed down before, in a wide array1 of 
studies on the crises afflicting Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s and, more 
particularly, on ways to overcome them. None is particularly new - the 
initial community development enthusiasm at state level in Africa dates to 
the late colonial era of the 1950s and early 1960s. User charges for basic 
health care in rural areas were (faute de mieux) central in Christian 
health care work in Africa at least from the 1920s. Universal access to 
basic health care was a frequent - and not purely rhetorical - political 
goal and an occasional priority in resource allocation in SSA at least one 
and one-half decades before "Health for All by the Year 2000" was declared 
in Alma Ata under WHO leadership at the end of the 1970s. At least one 
central support system cum community staff cum community payment for drugs 
and local staff had existed on a fluctuating but moderately broad base from 
the late 1940s until the post-1987 Somalian civil war destroyed it (at 
least for the time being). Nor is prioritisation either new nor 
necessarily associated with advocates of narrowly limited state roles, e.g. 
"To plan is to choose" is a quotation from President Nyerere's launching 
preface to Tanzania's 1969-74 Five Year Plan and its operational meaning is 
illustrated by the phasing of literacy and universal primary education 
build-up over fifteen years even though both were genuinely high priorities 
throughout the period. Better governance in the sense of administrative 
reform has been a pervasive policy (or more accurately policy study) theme 
for decades - the tomes on staff structures, training schemes and
2procedural regulations prepared (and in some cases implemented) in Sub- 
Saharan Africa since 1945 would fill a fair sized library and take a 
reasonably long academic lifetime to read. To do so might not be a very 
fruitful prioritisation, as one striking characteristic is the limited 
number of themes and approaches and another the tendency to move in loops 
or circles from one approach to another and often back to the starting 
point. This journey is characterised by almost always seeking structural 
change as an initial option; rarely trying to build on the strengths of 
what existed and virtually never sticking with any one approach long enough 
to have any very clear reason to suppose it could not be made to work.
To look at this record, even by personal recall over a quarter century or 
by dipping into a non-random selection of contemporary documents and 
studies suggests several things:
a. a tendency for "new" initiatives to be remarkably innocent of any 
serious analysis or understanding the historic context out of which 
(often in reaction to which) they arose;
b. abiding concern with certain quite real problems sometimes leading to
cumulative change - e.g. the shift toward primary health care from 
the late 1960s; but more frequently
c. rapid changes of direction both in international development
institution and academician's themes and priorities, frequently 
fairly characterisable as "fashions", contrasting oddly with these 
same bodies' and persons' calls for long term perspectives, 
institution building and building up predictability and continuity;
d. parallel to substantial changes in actual policy and resource
allocations in Sub-Saharan Africa, by no means wholly resulting from 
- nor on the same timetable as - the international "development 
fashions";
e. a tendency to move in circles (or if one is very optimistic, spirals)
returning to or near the starting point - but without recognizing it, 
much less knowing it for the first time, more frequently than on a 
coherent sequential path with occasional diversions or backtracking;
3f. a relatively blind faith in the ability of professionals2 
(bureaucrats, economists, doctors, etc.) to "get the job done" if 
only they could be properly trained and motivated and "structures" 
reformed, combined with relatively little analysis of contextual or 
philosophical problems and a good deal of abuse of present and past 
actual performance by present and past actual professionals;
g. a near total lack of serious reflection on how central national 
programmes initiated by high politicians and professionals in the 
capital (at least in the articulated operational sense even when at 
least partly in response to genuine self-perceived problems, needs 
demands of ordinary people and communities) could be linked to 
genuine community participation (which is inherently diverse and 
uneven to the point of driving a normal bureaucrat up the wall);
h. a failure in official statements and programmes or quasi-official 
analytical to address political system, political process, power 
allocation and maintenance and related macro political economic 
issues seriously with most economic academic writing either 
duplicating the official lack of specific attention and/or referring 
to these issues in non-operational symbolic terms ("honesty", 
"political will") and the specialist political science work often in 
such narrowly political and country specific contexts as to be little 
more integrated into policy programme or personnel structure 
formulation or resource allocation prioritisation even at country and 
still less at cross-country level.
To each generalisation there are exceptions. The largest clusters are the 
"Africa has set out wrong"3 group. Many are close to being mirror images 
of the mainstream writings (of the same time or of a decade before). At 
least implicitly most are based on prophetic models of what ought to be in 
contrast to the apocalyptically denounced present and recent (often very 
recent and not wholly typical) past.4 In fact the underlying models 
(modernisation, pluralism, various varieties of Marxism, neo-liberalism) 
are the same as those of the more positive writers. As a result nearly 
every set of such approaches has at one time or another been seen actual 
attempts at articulation and implementation. These have rarely been
4notably more successful than those proceeding directly from affirmation 
without previous systematic denunciation. Indeed in some cases (including 
notably Dumont himself) the progenitors after transitory enthusiasm have 
denounced the programmes they helped inspire as even worse than the 
practice they sought to replace!
The temptation after surveying this record is to echo sad reflections on 
mortality from "when all is said and done more is said than done" through 
"le plus ca change, le plus c'est la meme chose" and "vanity of vanities... 
nothing new under the sun" to "twenty years largely wasted". That too has 
its limitations:
a. it is not an approach open to actual Africans in Africa whether 
ordinary women in the fields and men on the street or bureaucrats and 
other professionals or politicians. Despair and detached criticism 
with neither expectation of, nor hope for, positive change are 
primarily amenity consumer goods (or for some writers working 
capital) of outsiders;5
b. It is unduly negative - a rather impressive catalogue of partial 
successes in governance, in administration, in institution building, 
in rising literacy and falling infant morality, in production, in 
thwarting externally designed and/or executed military intervention, 
in survival, in continuing to hope and to try can be compiled. 
Similarly, in some areas - including primary health care - there has 
been forward progress on a cumulative basis in conceptualisation and 
training which provides some real foundation for rehabilitation of 
quality and expansion of quantity if resources (not least for living 
wages to personnel) and foreign exchange (especially for drugs) can 
be mobilised. The relative failure to do so relates in part to "good 
news is no news", in part to treating the successes as a matter of 
course needing no comment6* and in part to an understandable 
prioritisation on what needs to be done that is not now being done 
(or not done well);
c. it also fails to be contextual, taking diversity into account (at 
levels ranging from macro continental to basic community). The 
governance of Tanzania or Zimbabwe is not that of Uganda nor Zaire
5either on a snapshot nor an historic moving picture basis. Nor are 
the economic performances of Botswana or Kenya very similar to those 
of Mozambique or Ghana. As a result it frequently fails to provide 
even a rough blueprint of the specific present of any country nor a 
sketch design as to how it might be altered.
These points are not unique to Africa - they apply in varying degree to 
work (applied or otherwise) on development, on governance and on 
administration much more generally. The African 'case1 may pose them more 
starkly because of the high levels of failure common since 1980 (and in 
some cases much longer), the rapidity of change in Sub-Saharan Africa and - 
even more in perceptions of it (by Africans and non-Africans alike) - since 
the 1950s, and the degree of abiding external influence on policy and 
praxis in SSA which makes it more attractive to those wishing to make 
experiments and see their ideas put into practice. '
That this paper focuses on the interaction of community participation, 
national prioritisation and resource mobilisation in relation to basic 
health services in certain Sub-Saharan Africa contexts over the past few 
years has five reasons:
1. basic health care is important;
2. community participation both normatively and operationally has
substantial potential;
3. coherent national priorities' interaction with diversity relating to
local preferences, possibilities and needs is a topic of abiding 
importance and difficulty;
4. the Bamako Initiative (on "health for all by the year 2000",
community participation and resource mobilisation) and especially its 
partial implementation (or perversion in implementation depending on 
ones viewpoint) brings together most of the themes or slogans 
sketched and cursorily surveyed above;
65. the author has been working on this set of issues in Sub-Saharan
Africa, most immediately and concretely in Mozambique from 1986, but 
in a broader sense in many more countries since 1960.®
Before looking at the Bamako Declaration as adopted and the Bamako 
Initiative as partly implemented (Bamako 1 and Bamako 2 as some critics 
call them) it is useful to glance at health service
administration/bureaucracy and at the community participation case as 
usually made in respect to health.
Of Bureaucrats and Bandages
Classic health service administration is at first glance the very model of 
a model Weberian bureaucracy. It is hierarchical and maintains very 
substantial autonomy from outside interference in its functioning 
(especially by clients). It receives cases and screens them into, a) 
nothing to do (i.e. not ill, no preventative programme needed); b) 
handleable at this level (i.e. routine case or prevention activity); c) 
referral upward (i.e. special problems) - in some systems at four or more 
levels (health post, health centre, rural hospital, urban hospital, 
reference hospital plus parallel or associated preventative service 
levels).g Criteria for screening and action or referral are laid down 
uniformly for the system and - at least in principle - known to all staff. 
At each level most cases are screened out or acted upon within the 
prescribed framework and only a minority (usually a small minority) 
referred upward. Individual cases (i.e. implementation) rarely if ever 
reach top officials let alone Ministers.10 Policy operates in the opposite 
direction - largely proposed and totally articulated by experienced 
bureaucrats (who may or may not be medically trained) with professional 
inputs and political initiatives.11 It is set out in concrete terms and 
sent down the line to be acted upon. Functional coordination (e.g. 
physician-surgeon in systems practising that odd historic division) is 
common at middle levels within the service, but strategic (e.g. district 
medical stores - district health officer) is very uneven and inter- 
institutional (e.g. with agriculture on the availability side of nutrition 
or commerce and finance on nutrition's cost/income side) are rare, very 
high level or specialised institution encapsulated (entombed?) and recent.
7But in three other respects health service bureaucracies are atypical.
First, they give a much higher role to the medical1,1 professional vis a vis 
the specialist administrator than is normal. Ministers and top level civil 
servants are frequently doctors; hospital heads (and actual administrative 
bosses) were until recently usually doctors. Only educators in education 
and - more recently - economists, especially but not only in finance, have 
been even vaguely comparable in successfully establishing the professional 
specialist as boss and the professional administrator as supporting 
staff.13 One has Surgeons General (and Chief Economists); one does not 
have Engineers or Architects General (nor engineering heads of government 
wide engineering cadres).
Second, health services administration is rather more decentralised than 
structural charts would suggest, especially on the curative side.
Hospitals do not in practice treat (or not treat) patients identically.
They often do not provide comparable services at the same level nor have 
even vaguely comparable internal administrative processes nor unit costs.1,1 
This may result from the professional specialist domination noted above 
because the specialist professional has less built-in respect for general 
orders than the professional administrator.
Third, health services historically have either begun the screening process 
at a higher than normal level (e.g. doctor not nurse or para-medic) or 
referred a very high percent of cases to professionals at higher levels of 
skill than are necessary, (i.e. doctors rather than nurses and medical 
aides).15 At least the devolution of the bulk of cases to primary health 
units with basically paramedical personnel, limited basic drug and vaccine 
stocks and guidelines for referral which is at the heart of the 'phc 
revolution1 makes no sense unless the previous practice suffered from this 
error on a grand scale. In administrative theory/bureaucratic process that 
is inefficient, e.g. primary schools do not refer all examination results 
and homework to the Head, pump repair technicians in water are expected to 
handle routine maintenance and repair without reference to the District 
Water Engineer.
There have been some patterns of change in administration of health 
services as in other branches of administration. The role of specialist 
administrative professionals has expanded and other professions than
8clinical medicine have been given wider roles (e.g. in running physical 
facilities and managing stocks and flows, e.g. of drugs and vaccines but 
also in policy formulation, health service economies and the 
preventative/public health sector). This has parallelled an attempt to 
reduce certain aspects of decentralisation at least largely in the service 
of cost control. For example, national drug lists and standard "hotel- 
keeping" cost targets for hospitals, do reduce unit or professional level 
autonomy and in that sense at least are centralising tendencies. Less 
uniformly there have been attempts to reduce hierarchicalism and to empower 
'lower1 level staff (variously titled) to deal with the up to 80-90% of 
cases which do not require a doctor's judgement as to treatment or non­
treatment. This empowerment has three aspects - additional training for 
low level staff or new intermediate cadres, broadening the scope for action 
at that level and more detailed guiding rules on action or referral.
There can be tension between these two types of shift. National drug lists 
centralise and increase hierarchical dominance; on the other hand, 
authorisation for paramedical personnel (or medical aides and sub­
pharmacist dispensers) to diagnose and prescribe for certain common 
illnesses from a limited drug list decentralises and reduces hierarchical 
dominance. Many primary health care strategies overtly, and for good 
reasons, advocate and seek to operate on both fronts.
Both the centralising and decentralising shifts have in general been
achieved (to the extent they have) in the face of opposition from a 
majority of medical professionals. They do not make the health services
bureaucracy more open to inputs or influence from clients. For example, a
potential or actual patient-doctor association for a hospital is virtually 
inconceivable except as a public relations or fund-raising device, although 
parent-teacher associations for schools are relatively common and do at 
least discuss policy and professional practice even, if their influence on 
them is usually rather marginal.
Of Communities, Participators and Patients
The colonial African community development/animation rurale drives of the 
late 1940s were not primarily concerned with health but with social 
welfare, adult education and production. However, they came to include
9pure water supply, nutrition (on the dietary and food preparation side) and 
environmental sanitation plus - less usually - basic health education and 
village dispensaries.lfe Thus they did have a not insignificant public 
health/health support component.
Nor were these drives particularly participatory in the normal sense of 
that term. The British and French colonial patterns were basically Fabian 
corporatist and French left Catholic as to ideological and philosophical 
foundations. Development from Below'1'7 was a target. At least implicitly 
was Small is Beautiful18 and development largely carried out and financed 
by those below. But that development was to be along lines set by the 
professional community developers and preached to (at?) those who were to 
carry out its precepts to "better themselves". In practice the nature of 
preaching and of participation was very diverse. Rigid authoritarianism 
(both overt right colonial bureaucratic and pseudo-Freirian left or right 
subliminal) was common but so was pragmatic, moderately listening and 
sympathetic education with the cd officer responding to villagers1 (cd and 
ar were overwhelming rural oriented) expressed ambitions, aspirations and 
proposals.
One frequent problem with community development was that it had a Western 
individualistic component which consorted oddly with its community focus 
and that its practitioners rarely bothered to study African community 
structures or - except by accident - to relate to them. This may relate to 
a second common weakness - failure to develop sustainable, long term 
community resource bases. A contributory factor was continued dependence 
for initiatives, professional inputs and programme development on the cd 
cadres, i.e. an absence of cumulative community institution and skills 
building. Where closer links with, up to engrafting on to, historic 
community structures happened the record on continued finance, 
institutional sustainability and - to a lesser extent - access to 
specialised skills were often overcome. However, the failure - except in 
adult education - to build inter-community links meant that even in these 
cases the new programmes tended to remain dependent on the cd organisation 
as patron and channel to resource allocators with the communities as 
isolated dependent clients.
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This form of top down community development has survived - e.g. the Harambee 
dynamic in Kenya, locality (including absent member) groupings in many African 
countries. From the administrator's point of view it has usually been seen as 
a useful complement to government programmes constrained by resources (and 
thus like church schools and hospitals to be taken over by the state when 
finance and personnel permitted). Concomitantly, however, it has been viewed 
as rather disorderly, hard to control and in danger of pre-empting government 
resources when it took the form (as it often did) of providing infrastructure 
for health, education, roads or water which were then to be operated by the 
state.
Community participation in health conceptualisations are related to the public
health, environmental sanitation, water and adult education aspects of
traditional cd. They assume that communities will increase their involvement
in and make added resources available to programmes with which they are
integrally involved. The Front Line Health Worker approach stresses
education, promotion, first aid and very basic (say 20-25) drug distribution
for the commonest diseases to be carried out by community chosen, at least
partly community financed persons, provided with state (or external agency)
training. That approach goes beyond the traditional doctor/hospital model in
two senses: it is a more financially feasible route to universal access to
health services and it takes a broader public health/environmental context
20approach rather than a narrower clinical/curative one. But it does not
really address the issue of patient participation in own health and treatment
nor does it resolve the problem of how the nexus of central health programmes
and targets together with local accountability of front line workers can be
resolved if what the flw's do as well as how they do it is part of
accountability. In the cases in which it has assumed near total support of
the front line workers plus payments for drugs from the communities after
moderate and brief initial resource injections, it has usually, but not 
21always, proven to be unsustainable. Successes tend to have outside as well 
as community resource bases plus very dynamic community (or cluster of 
community) leaders. They are also usually in areas with above average (by the 
standards of that country's rural areas) household cash incomes and with a 
context of community action broader than health services alone to carry out 
concrete projects or programmes. The number of demises of apparently stable 
programmes with the loss of the programme's leader, the key link person with 
the state (or Christian) medical system and/or of external (including state or
11
Christian medical system) partial funding suggest much more analysis is needed 
of replicability and sustainability requirements.
Bamako - Basic Reaffirmation or Betrayal?
The Bamako Declaration of the African Ministers of Health and the Bamako
Initiative it launched have aroused enthusiasms and criticisms of some
22vehemence with somewhat surprising membership m  each category. Both the 
generation and the implementation of the Declaration/Initiative illustrate 
some of the complexities and problematics of health politics. On the face of 
it the Declaration appears to seek to further an agenda based on universal 
access to basic medical services by the year 2000 target set out in the Alma 
Ata Declaration. Its themes include beginning with primary preventative and 
curative health care, decentralisation and community involvement in fund 
raising and fund use. Two pre-existing community/national health 
service/external cooperating body programmes - in Benin and Senegal - probably 
drawn on in drafting the Declaration are usually seen as having had that 
impact.
The 1987 Bamako Declaration of African Ministers of Health can be seen as a
reaffirmation of Health for All by 2000 and an exploration of how it can be
made more than a slogan under conditions of extreme economic stringency with
low growth, stagnation or decline in real resources available to central
health budgets. Rapid progress in broadening access to health services in
Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960s - albeit from a very low base - began to
falter in many countries in the 1970s and to go into reverse in a majority in
the 1980s. Maintenance, equipment and transport were early casualties
followed by drugs and other operating supplies including patients' food and
linen. Reduction of real salaries damaged health personnel morale further and
led to skill drain, as well as to privately imposed user charges in nominally
free facilities and to open corruption. In respect of drugs, as well as of
equipment and transport, foreign exchange constraints often choked off actual
availability even when local currency finance was provided. Overall the
quantity, quality and range of services eroded and in some countries and many
peripheral areas (largely, but not only, rural) declined to near the vanishing 
2Rpoint.
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The initial deficit pruning by expenditure cutting phases of several, though
not all, structural adjustment programmes (e.g. Ghana and Mozambique but not
Tanzania) led to further erosion of real resource availability. In certain
cases this was offset, so far as drugs went, by additional grant aid but such
aid rarely was prioritised, allocated and programmed coherently enough to be
effective (i.e. it left glaring structural gaps which in many cases made drug
and personnel use relatively inefficient for want of complementary inputs).
World Bank attempts to reverse these shocks and the longer running erosion of 
ohhealth services have included restoration of central governments real 
financial allocations to pre-SAP levels, additional soft foreign finance and 
user fees. The case for the latter was a combination of a neo-liberal belief 
that users should pay and a pragmatic (if not necessarily correct) perception 
that such fees could augment total resources available to health services 
significantly.
Bamako faced these challenges and initiatives by calling for greater resource
provision by: external donors, central governments and communities/patients.
The external donor role was perceived as crucial to breaking the foreign
25exchange bottleneck. It was also (rather optimistically ) seen as a means to 
support establishment of national basic drugs lists (by level of care) and 
improving efficiency of purchasing to lower costs. The central government 
appeal appears to have been more a call for halting real cuts or restoration 
to levels well below those of - e.g. 1980 - than a serious attempt to gain 
substantial increases. So the communities and individual users were seen as 
the main hope for restoring adequate health service finance. In this context 
it was argued that users did value health services and, in fact, were spending 
more on private ones because public services were deteriorating. Those 
payments could be clawed back to augment Ministry of Health budgets.
The community/patient involvement theme is, in all fairness, advocated on 
broader grounds than rescuing Ministry of Health finances and medical 
professionals' incomes. Community participation is seen as contributing to 
health for all by causing more effective communication between communities and 
health service professionals and more personal consciousness of healthy and 
unhealthy behavioural and living patterns. And in the Declaration community 
control of uses of funds is advocated, albeit how this is to be achieved in 
the case of revolving drug funds (whose expenditure is on centrally set lists
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and goes straight to the centre) is less than self-evident. This point is 
crucial both to what the Declaration may have meant at Bamako and does mean in 
practice since.
That is so because the main instrument proposed is revolving drug funds, 
initially funded by the counterpart of drug donations, but kept going by user 
fees. These it appears are to be set drug by drug, paid by the user, 
collected by the community, paid over to the state health service locally and 
largely or totally remitted to the central Ministry.
Ironically, the starting point for the drug fund concept, rural Tanzania, was 
not a relevant example of such a programme. Tanzania adamantly rejects full 
cost charging of drugs to patients as inherently in contradiction with 
universal access. It is prepared to finance the local currency cost of 
basic drugs from the budget. The basic problem was, and is, import capacity 
which cannot be solved by local currency drug charges. In practice it is 
arguable that a reductionist version of Bamako can and in some states will be 
used with highly negative results - including letting the government off the 
hook on its duty to provide phc, and of stifling community initiative as 
opposed to subordinated community actions taken at the behest of the centre.
Or - to put it differently - it can result in maximising central extraction of 
resources from poor, peripheral communities.
Synthesis or Unresolved Conflict?
Bamako represents an attempted synthesis of three very different (and 
ultimately contradictory) health politics approaches. The first is partly 
ideological and neo-liberal and partly a pragmatic response of hard pressed 
resource mobilising/allocating ministries (ultimately finance but also 
health). In the neo-liberal vision basic health care is arguably not a state 
duty and fees are of value in and of themselves. The resource 
mobilisation/allocation focus accepts that normal state revenues cannot be 
made to cover a basic primary-secondary-tertiary health services system 
(normally untrue) and seeks either to raise more funds from 
patients/communities to expand services (Health Minister optic) or to 
substitute them for allocations from general tax revenue (some Finance
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Ministers' view). From this optic, community participation is useful to 
increase resources collected and to lower collection costs and personnel 
problems for Health and Finance.
A middle approach is committed to health for all and - to varying degrees - to 
community participation well beyond finance and is quite pragmatic as to 
means. Community finance is perceived as raising total resources, increasing 
community influence over programmes as well as making health staff at least 
partially accountable to communities (users), and providing a first step 
toward broader (than paying) community involvement in improving their members' 
health. This is the largest bloc of proponents but also the one tending to 
have the least clear and the most co-optable agenda. For example, UNICEF's 
commitments to benefitting the poorest and to community participation in 
policy decisions is very real (albeit not always fully served by emergency 
campaigns composed of simple, centrally provided components which are 
initially vertical and may or may not be integrated into subsequent primary 
unit programming) are quite genuine. But how centrally imposed, full cost 
drug charges/revolving funds (which UNICEF backs) are compatible with either 
is hard to comprehend.
The third strand - largely ngo and church medical services based and
relatively weak in Africa - is committed to health for all but shares the
neo-liberal aversion to state involvement It sees community (or patient as
such) payment as a necessary means to replace an incompetent, intrusive,
manipulative state presence and to empower/enforce community determination
(guided by platonic guardians from the promoters) of health services and 
27health programmes.
At the level of general declarations an alliance can be forged (in both 
meanings) among these strands. Practice is likely to be rather different.
One - not uncommon - approach is for the centre to set up patient fee systems
by service and by drug (perhaps with complex, hard to work exemption and cap 
28provisions plus complex access, low resource backing social funds). These 
charges are then to be collected by communities or local health units for the 
state and largely or wholly remitted back to the centre. This may well not be 
the intent of the Declaration; it tends to be the operating face of the
Initiative.
15
That is a parody of community participation and a clear case of an 
authoritarian, inflexible structure for sucking resources out of peripheral 
communities with no guarantee of an equal, much less a substantially larger, 
return inflow. It is more likely to be an aggravation of the problem than 
even part of the answer.
To posit this danger is neither to be alarmist nor to assume ill-will, malice
or duplicity. Ministries of Finance are hard pressed - any cost reduction or
revenue augmentation looks like manna from heaven, especially if someone else
is to bear the bother of collection. Ministries of Health, under the combined
influences of needing more funds and being subjected to World Bank missionary
zeal for fees, are all too prone to adopt complex, rigid charge systems with
no serious consideration of access, administration personnel or net revenue
considerations and with no or unworkable safeguards for access by the poor.
(Predictably doctors are not very good at devising such systems nor working
through their impact. The skills needed to do so are not clinical.) Further,
Weberian bureaucratic central revenue collection systems, fee or charge
schedules with defined, fixed amounts and few judgemental exemptions are
desirable; indeed arguably necessary. But in terms of allowing real community
29participation or avoiding denial of access they are often nearly fatal.
Community Based Successes - Miracles, Fautes des Mieux or Mirages?
At this point it may be useful to glance back at two success stories - Somalia 
and Benin - to see whether, to what extent and why they are successes. (The 
Somalia case is considered as of 1987• 1988/89 civil war convulsions would
have destroyed any broad access phc system, not just the one that existed in 
half of rural Somalia.)
Somalia has a recurrent budget 90% engulfed by security, debt service and 
general administration; all objectively underfunded. Recurrent health 
spending as of 1987 was about $1.5 million ($0.3 per person). External funds 
(largely used outside or in joint ventures with the Ministry of Health) were 
of the order of $25 million and community inputs $5 to $7.5 million. In blunt 
terms there was neither a serious national governmental health system nor any
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chance of creating one and donors needed channels to reach the rural 
population of whom at least half are seasonally migratory ("nomadic") 
livestock growers or mixed farmers.
Communities chose part-time health workers to be trained for 6 weeks to 6 
months (by agencies which sometimes hire in government personnel) in simple 
diagnosis, prescription and health education. On their return they served the 
communities in return for payment in milk, meat, animals. Basic drugs were 
imported and delivered to pick up points by agencies (again hiring-in some 
government personnel) with the community (on any basis it chose) paying more 
or less the landed wholesale cost. Especially in the northwest where it goes 
back almost 50 years, the system worked reasonably well. But it was chosen
faute de mieux, not as an intended demonstration that a state medical system
was dispensable.^0
The Benin case is rather different, albeit it also includes charges for drugs. 
It operates to shore up a debilitated state medical service, not to substitute 
for it. The division of costs is - nominally at least - roughly for the state 
to provide and pay personnel, the patients to pay for drugs and the community 
to organise/carry out repairs to health posts and clinics. In practice donors 
provide most of the drugs to the state so that directly or via counterpart 
funds the cash paid out by the communities in fact goes to salaries or general 
administration, not to increasing the supplies of drugs available. The only 
non-problematic community element would appear to be the facility maintenance 
one. However, even if the changes de facto go to health service personnel 
this may improve service if they would, in fact, otherwise be paid
erratically. In that case it is another faute de mieux case.
Community Participation Reconsidered
Serious rethinking of community participation - with an emphasis on 
flexibility and community located use of community mobilised resources my be 
needed for Bamako to mark a positive point of departure:
a. the community would decide in what form it will provide resources, e.g. 
food (or help in fields to grow food) for health workers, materials and 
labour for health post and housing construction and/or maintenance may be
17
more readily mobilisable than cash but equally useful in augmenting
•3 1central resources available for health service delivery;J
b. the community would select the means to mobilise resources (user charges, 
annual assessments, semi-progressive "contributions") rather than being 
handed a rigid system from on high. The same principle applies to 
exemptions from/ceilings on charges - the community and community located 
health workers (at least in rural areas but also in many poor urban 
neighbourhoods) have the knowledge and the social matrix to operate these 
while the central government rarely does;
c. preventative and educational services (including well baby clinics, family 
planning, nutrition, sanitation) would be exempt at least until a firm, 
broad demand base, resting on personal experience of the value of these 
services has been built;
d. cash raised at community level would be spent there (e.g. drug charges if
levied as such used to pay post and clinic salaries) both to reduce
administrative/bookkeeping nightmares and to assure the community its
32money really does augment its health services;
e. communities could usefully be encouraged to view health services, pure 
water, fuel, nutrition and food security as inter-related and local level 
government health personnel provided with basic training to help develop 
that approach. In many contexts significant community resource 
mobilisation for these health supporting sectors may be more practicable 
than for health services proper. Thus, if one views the health context 
broadly, they may be more hopeful ways of augmenting total central 
government resources devetoed to enabling people to be healthy than direct 
health service user charges;
f. extension, promotion, education need to be extended, backed up and 
catalysed by community chosen, government trained, community based 
"animateurs" who may be full or part-time. In very poor communities - or 
in disaster periods as in Mozambique since 1983 where communities can, as 
a result of South Africa's proxy war of aggression, no longer afford to
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pay their animateurs - full or partial state finance would be needed. 
In such cases the principle of empowering communities to act for 
health overrides that of fiscal self-reliance.
These guide-lines would seek to maximise increases in health and health 
conducive services, not in central government revenues. Health fees are 
unlikely to raise by more than 1% of state budget revenues (or 10% to 20% 
of recurrent health costs).33 That amount can usually be raised by fairly 
minor indirect tax shifts (e.g. $0.1 per bottle of beer or packet of 
cigarettes). Whether a government unwilling to give that much priority to 
furthering health for all can reasonably be expected to use community 
raised resources to increase health budget provisions (let alone those to 
phc and rural areas), rather than to substitute them for tax revenue 
sources then redirected elsewhere, is at best an open question.
What these guide-lines do not posit is the appropriate interaction between 
state and community structures and the problems it is likely to create for 
each. Accountability to a community and carrying out even broadly defined 
national programmes can lead to tensions. The relationship between an 
administrator and a community based worker partly funded by the community 
cannot usefully be viewed as identical to that with his own 'lower' level 
staff. How intractable these problems are is less than clear because they 
are rarely articulated fully in advance and overcoming them is not normally 
set as an administrative priority
Diverse Communities, Flexible Systems and Central 
Coordination/Administration
In principle community choice of how to raise which resources poses few 
problems if the level is agreed. In practice it does if patterns vary 
significantly from district to district - as it is likely to do. How 
raised is less problematic except as it interacts with which resources 
(e.g. if poor households make payments in labour and food then those 
resources are not fungible into drugs or fuel). The problem may not be 
insuperable if there is a total financial allocation per district allowing 
for - say - 10% of total costs to be community raised and the specific uses 
of the central and community contributions are negotiated and specified in 
the budget at district (or at most regional/provincial) level. That,
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however, requires a degree of budgetary decentralisation which is quite 
unusual and, probably, hard to operate.
A second problem is how much or what proportion of district costs should be 
community funded. The easy route of a uniform per cent for all districts 
(or even all communities within a district) certainly is inequitable if the 
intent is equal burden relative to income above physical survival 
requirements and may be unworkable (especially if a substantial portion is 
to be in cash) in some very poor districts (and communities). The equal 
effort approach (either progressive in relation to community average income 
or proportional above some minimal survival level) would be equitable and, 
if it took actual specific surpluses (of labour, food and/or materials) 
into account, would be workable. It is the basis on which Australian 
fiscal allocations between different levels of government are made albeit 
in that case all allocations are in cash. But, if it is to operate at 
district/community level (for health or education or extension services), a 
rapid capacity appraisal technique will need to be devised which is 
understandable/acceptable to communities.
Whether operational waiver provisions are a problem depends on the 
contribution system. A community lump sum payment based on other than user 
fee sources obviates the need for waivers as there is no fee at use level. 
It is in fact a simple health insurance (more accurately illness insurance) 
system. (Sanctions on households who fail to contribute could still be a 
problem but, probably, a lesser one.) Otherwise the need to have the 
primary contact level (nurse, medical aide, dispenser) decide whether the 
would be patient is unable to pay is hard to square with standard 
administrative practice which abhors large numbers of judgemental decisions 
at base/'low' levels. Further the contact medical personnel may or may not 
have adequate knowledge to evaluate poverty status. But reference upward 
for decisions takes time and - quite literally - can kill. If a percentage 
of absolutely poor people (allowable waivers) could be agreed for each 
district or community34 and the community could provide a list of who fell 
within that category this would be workable both for health personnel and 
Treasuries. But the identification would be a very large "if" - certainly 
central government cannot do it and one may have doubts as to how many 
communities can.313
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A fourth problem relates to accountability of personnel. If both community 
front line health workers and primary level (curative and preventative) 
state employees are partly financed by and accountable to both state and 
community, what is accountability to mean in practice? Central government 
ability to discipline except for gross mal- and non-feasance tends to be 
low. Oddly, community sanctions might be easier where a significant 
portion of food, housing and/or wages comes from that source.
Accountability as to programme structure and priorities may prove an even 
more problematic area for "power sharing". National or provincial planning 
tends to set fairly uniform targets by district and by community (at least 
by community served at all) with limited campaign and localised disease 
exceptions. This may or not be consistent with most communities' 
preferences - it is unlikely to be seen as optimal by all. Indeed it is 
unlikely to be optimal for community members some of each. How far health 
planning can be decentralised to such structural issues as campaign vs 
integrated vaccination/immunisation thrusts and priorities among different 
preventative, curative and extension (animateur) components is unclear. It 
is certainly not common and requires both some limits on scatter and high 
skill levels of the health services/community negotiators to avoid serious 
loss of coherence and/or inefficient uses of resources. The bottom line 
problem is that both professionals and communities have both relevant 
knowledge and also limits to the scope/correctness of their vision.16”
Finally what is to be done in respect to district/communities which place a 
low priority37 on health/health services? One route is to compute their 
equal effort contribution and - if they refuse to meet it - to provide no 
health services. This is hardly consonant with universal access to basic 
services and may do little to educate potential patients to give a higher 
priority to health or health services. This is especially true if present 
low priority to paying for health services relates to negligible or bad 
past experience with them, not to a low priority to health per se. A 
second is to have a fixed ratio (e.g. if the equal effort level is 15% of 
total spending at district or community level to relate the government1s 
85% to actual contribution). The planning and administrative difficulties 
of such a system would be very high, particularly as contributions might be 
pledged and not delivered, which logically would require intra-year 
cutbacks. A third option would be to seek to provide a basic services 
level (including some basic drugs) to all districts/communities with
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specific additional programmes (including larger numbers of animateurs and 
dispensaries and/or larger quantities of drugs) linked to contributions. 
This may in principle be optimal - the experience with the basic level 
(especially if it included significant educational and public health 
components) might well raise community willingness to contribute. The 
moral problem of denying any service would be averted. But it is not clear 
whether this option can be planned, financed or administered in most 
African countries. A fourth option is to ignore low or unfulfilled pledges 
and seek to provide uniform services on a universal access basis whatever 
community funding is (or is not) delivered. That is simple for programme 
design and coordination and for avoiding denial of access if the approach 
is fiscally practicable. However, it is likely to lead to fiscal problems 
and to become a classic "freeloader" case with the ratio of "freeloaders" 
rising over time as the reality of services not being related to 
contributions is observed.
Envoi
This paper has not sought to provide a comprehensive analysis of "Health 
for All", health service administration, community participation3'3 or user 
contributions.Rather it has sought to raise a limited number of 
administrative problems arising from their interaction. Whether these 
problems are self-evident is a matter for the reader. What can be said is 
that they are rarely raised in official health planning and budgeting, 
health service structure or sectoral advisory documents.41
Institution building and training are universally accepted as priorities in 
SSA. So, in a rather narrow sense, is administrative reform and, less 
uniformly, some form of decentralisation and community involvement. But 
restoration of classic administration^2 - useful as it would be and vital 
as it may well be in some aspects of health service provision - will not by 
itself be adequate for decentralisation incorporating serious power sharing 
between state and community levels or between bureaucrats/professionals and 
community members/leaders. The issues posed above do need to be addressed 
seriously to determine the desirable content and structure of reformed 
institutions, improved training, decentralisation and restoration of 
bureaucratic efficiency.
The appearance of posing more questions than answers and that of 
questioning each option set out are a reflection of reality. Candour
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requires the admission that we know little, largely because posing the 
questions is - with rare exceptions - a precondition for serious analysis 
and dialogue on ways forward, which is in turn at least highly desirable 
before initiating widespread structural, strategic, policy programmatic, 
institutional and administrative changes.
aNotes
1. e.g. from Unicef Within Human Reach, the Khartoum Declaration and 
UNECA's African Alternatives To Structural Adjustment to the World 
Bank's "long term study" Sustainable Growth with Equity: A Long-Term 
Perspective for Sub-Saharan Africa.
2. Which professionals in which disciplines varies from author to 
author. Both the most unquestioning upholders and sharpest critics 
of most sub-groups tend to be from within the sub-group.
3. The title is that of Rene Dumont's initial seminal volume. Ironically 
Dumont had a subsequent history of rather optimistic enthusiasm for a 
number of alternatives followed by speedy and deep alienation from 
their actual practice - a characteristic common in this genre.
4. The Bank's original 1981 Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: A Programme for Action was - while very shy about saying so - 
in large part a savage attack on two decades of Bank policy and 
praxis in SSA as well as a neo-liberal apocalyptic condemnation of 
African and external state actors on grounds between 120° and 180° 
different from Dumont's (let alone Samir Amin's!).
5. Outsider as used here is not fully correlated to ethnic or national 
origin. Some African critics are in their intellectual stance 
outsiders whether now based in Africa or abroad. This is not per se 
intellectually unsound (Socrates was an outsider), but it is unlikely 
to be a productive starting point for policy oriented/policy 
influencing research.
6. e.g. Tanzanians see no particular problem in respect to smallholders 
(1 to 3 ha family farmers) backed by extension services growing 
reasonable quality Virginia tobacco - because that approach has 
worked for over 30 years. Until very recently Zambia assumed and 
acted on the assumption no such approach was practicable - because it 
had never been tried.
7. For a policy or strategy oriented researcher to hope that his ideas
and concepts will be used is reasonable. For him to see initial 
attempts as experiments may be nearly inevitable, albeit it is not a 
perspective which can be welcome to the experimentee. The root 
problem in Africa is the relative weakness of African researchers, 
administrators and politicians vis a vis the external partners with 
whom they interact and the - sometimes unintentional -
independence/dominance relation this creates. It is an unfortunate
fact that even in SSA states seriously committed to self- 
determination and self-definition, expatriate proposals from a source 
carrying respect or finance frequently get a hearing far more readily 
than national proposals of equal quality (indeed sometimes the same 
proposals are rejected when made by nationals but acted on when re­
channelled via a sympathetic foreign adviser).
8. And, therefore, is evidently open to a number of the criticisms made
in the opening section including what he would now view as inadequate 
(even if abnormally high for a strategy and policy adviser) attention 
to administration.
b9. This model is clearest in respect to curative medicine - which has 
historically accounted, and still accounts, for the bulk of medical 
service resources and activities. Preventative programming has had a 
higher proportion of centrally designed campaigns. But even there 
continuing programmes have had routine, primary unit level aspects 
with complications in respect to their implementation or results 
referred up.
10. Individual curative cases never reach top administrators of 
Ministers. In that sense medical service administration is almost an 
idealised archetype of bureaucratic process. But if several cases 
have a common characteristic overcoming which requires inputs beyond 
those directly under doctors' control - e.g. incubators for babies, 
heart treatment machines - a budgetary allocation and/or a 
prioritisation of overall resources issue are likely to arise from 
them.
11. Nominally doctors as doctors do not make policy. This is part of the 
broader intellectual construct for dividing technical analysis of 
options and implementation of decisions (professional, apolitical) 
from taking decisions and determining policy (non-professional, 
political). In its pure form the construct has never had global 
acceptance, at least partly because analysis of options can never be 
totally impartial nor value free and does influence policy decisions 
while implementation necessarily influences the results and indeed 
nature of such decisions. This is particularly true of health 
services because answers to technical questions have life or death 
consequences readily visible to lay-persons, and because medical 
professionals are more successful than most in convincing non-medical 
administrators and ministers that they, the doctors, do know better 
even on issues which pretty clearly have non-medical aspects, e.g. 
balance between primary and hospital care or preventative and 
curative.
12. Curative medical in almost all cases.'
13. Whether this inversion of the professional administrator as boss and 
the specialist professionals as support staff model is desirable or 
not is unclear. There is a good deal to be said both for specialist 
training in administration and in the substantive content of the 
institution administered.
14. In Tanzania in the early 1970s, the differences were 16:1 at district 
and 4:1 at referral hospitals in respect to room and board costs. In 
no way could these differences be related to quality of facilities 
and only very partially to varying locality costs of food.
15. There are other - quantitatively significant - problems with the 
referral system. One is that bad transport often means patients 
physically cannot be moved. Another - exemplified by urban Zimbabwe 
- is that at city hospital level there is little differentiation of 
severity or complexity of cases between general and consultancy 
hospitals apart from a few specialties. Yet a third is that without 
very strict rules (and their application) on initial appearance at 
primary level facilities (except for emergencies), there is a 
tendency to go direct to hospitals rather than first to clinics or 
posts when both levels are accessible. However the number of cases
cinvolved is much smaller than that from a traditional doctor as first 
screener system if, in fact, 80 to 90 per cent of cases can be 
diagnosed and treated (screened out) by nursing or medical aide level 
professionals.
16. An exception was then British Somaliland which built up central
training and drug supply logistics for 'nomad' community selected
medical assistants who collected for drug costs and were communally 
paid. This development from the late 1940s seems to have related to 
very exiguous colonial government finance and the difficulty in using 
standard clinic/dispensary techniques to serve mobile populations.
17. The title of a seminal 1950s OUP volume by Ursula Hicks.
18. Ernst Friedrich Schumacher's volume is of course of the 1970s but it 
is in the 1950s CD idiom.
19. The author owes this point to Professor Emanuel de Kadt. It is in 
fact a general problem of grass-roots or basic community 
organisations that they usually find building up regional or national 
networks or relating to central political, administrative or 
juridical bodies much more difficult than own organisation and direct 
action. The justification of many indigenous ngo's (e.g. in the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka and India - less frequently in Africa) is to 
provide support (or partial substitutes) for such links and a channel 
to central sources of power. While foreign ngo's occasionally play 
such roles they are usually more analogous to the historic cd 
organisations in their relations with communities (e.g. the German 
left ngos - Ruvuma Development Association saga in Tanzania which 
certainly did not raise productivity nor create stable communities 
but did - inevitably - create antagonistic relationships/lack of 
relationships between RDA and district and regional political and 
governmental units).
20. CD on the health front was in practice was public health/health 
support in focus, but largely because its links to mainline health 
services were usually weak.
21. Somalia was until its present implosion - the most widespread 
(perhaps 20% of rural population) and longest running (30 years 
albeit with vicissitudes) exception. Even in that case, cooperating 
agency costs in relation to primary health care at community level 
probably were 1.5 to 2.5 times those of communities.
22. e.g. UNICEF - normally very concerned about the impact of fees on 
access - is a fervent adherent and co-promoter. In this it parallels 
the World Bank's theoretical model on charging and its variant in 
favour of using local communities as "tax farmers" to collect fees
a model also favoured by USAID.
23. That drug availability (public and private) declined is not in 
dispute. Nor is there any doubt that, especially but not only in 
rural areas and at primary care level units, the shortages were 
frequently crippling. There is a reason to believe that the 
selection of drugs was not always cost efficient nor even appropriate 
clinically and that too high prices were paid for what was bought. 
National drug lists and bulk purchasing with a preference for 
generics are among the proposals made for these weaknesses.
dSimilarly poor inventory preservation and control have led to wastage 
and 'leakage' as has inadequate feedback on actual lower level unit 
needs and uses. Two-way communication on stocks, uses and needs from 
local to central level; better stock control and rehabilitated 
storage facilities (plus prompt clearance of arriving shipments have 
been proposed in this regard. Whether the drug shortages not soluble 
by these means related primarily to fiscal as opposed to forex 
shortages - i.e. whether local currency drug fees would have been of 
major help in alleviating them - is unclear and probably varies by 
country.
24. While the Bank still terms its "Human Dimension" or "Absolute Poverty 
Reduction" analysis and programming "Social Dimensions of 
Adjustment", it now interprets SDA broadly and positively to relate 
to basic service extension and poor household livelihood improvement 
whether or not their erosion or collapse related to the Structural 
Adjustment Programme or from the underlying context and trends which 
caused the SAP's adoption. This is particularly the case in 
Sustainable Growth with Equity.
25. Unless the channel for the funds is UNIPAC/UNICEF, external donor 
supply of drugs tends both to reduce national power to coordinate or 
define flows and also to increase the array of drugs provided. Even 
in that case it tends to deter purchases from domestic producers, who 
are asserted to be high cost and/or low quality even when these 
claims are less than self-evidently justified.
26. Tanzania has for 20 years had low user charges at primary level with 
higher ones at hospital level. Partial moves toward a cost recovery 
programme in 1989 do seek to provide for waiver to very poor patients 
- analogous to that more or less achieved in respect to education 
fees. Further, they do not represent an initiative seen as wise in 
service provision and access terms by the Ministry of Health nor as 
particularly important as a direct source of funds by the Treasury. 
Rather they are a limited, calculated, negotiated bargain to secure 
identified increases in external finance for the health sector which 
was conditional on higher user charges.
27. That some dictatorships with elitist health services systems and, 
indeed, some elected governments do resemble this model is not at 
issue. What is arguable is whether the way forward lies in replacing 
and excluding the state from the phc arena or seeking to compel it to 
accept its responsibility for it in both work and resource 
allocations. This is a hotly debated issue in certain countries,
e.g. the Philippines both before and since 1986.
28. There is an inherent equity problem with full cost or even 
substantial cost recovery in the case of health services. The more a 
household needs such services, the lower (absolutely and relative to 
its own past levels) its income is likely to be. This is the case 
for health insurance. The community funding partial analogue to 
health insurance would be a sum per household (raised on whatever 
basis the community saw as desirable/practicable) not a collation of 
user fees.
29. In Mozambique urban use of services after new fees/drug charges were 
adopted in 1987 fell over 50% in two years while for exempted 
services it rose by about the same per cent. The lower flat rural
econsultancy and drug fees had mixed effects. In some districts they 
did fall within most households' financial capacity and waivers 
seemed to handle the exceptions. In other districts, cash income was 
nearly nil so any cash fee at all was a well nigh insurmountable 
barrier to access for the majority. (Poverty in Mozambique. 
Consultant's Report by R. H. Green, Office of the Prime Minister 
1989; UNICEF Study on Bamako Initiative (in Mozambique context,
1989.)
30. Based on Somali Government, UNDP and UNICEF data collected in the 
course of preparing an (unpublished) 1987 UNICEF country study.
31. The 1989 draft agreement between Mozambique and the World Bank on 
reviving the APE (community based front line health worker programme) 
does provide for the possibility of such contributions in kind. This 
amendment of the initial proposals was made on the initiative of 
Mozambique.
32. Unless basic drugs are largely domestically produced (rarely the 
case, albeit Zimbabwe is an exception) additional domestic currency 
resources may well not visibly and automatically lead to higher drug 
availability. If that happens, the credibility of paying more to get 
more and of the community structures relating to health are likely to 
be eroded seriously and swiftly.
33. Calculated from various World Bank Health Sector studies albeit the 
1% figure is not stated in them. It comes from multiplying the 5% to 
8% typical share of health in the recurrent budget by .1 to .2 and 
taking more or less the middle of the resulting 0.5% to 1.6% range.
34. In practice by having a limited number of categories, not detailed 
evaluation and negotiation of each case.
35. This is not simply a matter of knowledge. Mozambican grupos 
dinimisadores do know household characteristics quite well. But, as 
discovered in the course of the 1988 Urban Surveys, they do not pick 
out absolutely poor households (as identified by income, expenditure 
and malnutrition data) very reliably. Female headed households are 
particularly likely to be overlooked even by female grupo members.
36. To assert that patients and communities know a good deal about their 
health needs is one thing. To assert that they have adequate 
technical knowledge to design optimal priority packages is a 
different - and hard to defend - contention especially in relation to 
new (and thus unknown to the community) services.
37. The variation in revealed priority to health services exists 
nationally as well as at community level. In terms of commitment to, 
and attempts to sustain or restart, wide access phc systems Botswana, 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Kenya, Mauritius, Eritrea, Cape Verde 
and Senegal fall into a relatively high commitment category while 
Malawi, Angola, Zambia, Ethiopia, Somalia, Ghana, Nigeria, Cote 
d'Ivoire and Zaire fall into a low commitment category. Why is by no 
means entirely clear. Standard ideological categorisation does not 
correlate very well, nor does colonial heritage. Regionally Southern 
and Eastern Africa seem to have slightly higher average commitment 
than West and Equatorial Africa and the Horn but each sub-region has
fa wide scatter. Nor do the degrees of commitment bear much relation 
to available resource levels and trends. Most oddly, they also bear 
limited relationship to raw budget share data. This may relate to 
larger off budget (programme aid in kind - drugs, personnel, 
equipment) resources mobilised by high commitment countries, to 
greater efficiency in resource use and/or to more a complex 
combination of factors. There is a correlation with a state's 
concern for the attainment of minimum levels of well-being by all - 
or almost all - of its people whatever the general approach to the 
role of the state and the public sector in economic activity or to 
the degree of commitment to egalitarianism in the sense of limiting 
income differentials. Whether the reasons for this "revealed 
preference" human condition concern in, e.g. Kenya, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Senegal (or its apparent absence in Malawi, Angola,
Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire) are uniform is much less evident. The 
problem from the optic of this paper - and of phc more generally - is 
what action is possible in the context of low state priority for 
health services generally and for phc in particular. The Somalia 
case cited earlier (external donor to community hiring in certain 
government health services personnel) is an extreme solution. On one 
reading, the Benin case (drug aid leading to counterpart fund de 
facto paying field level government health services personnel) is an 
intermediate one. Targeted basic drug kit and vaccine provision for 
phc (e.g. in Ghana and Angola) plus the creation (or recreation) of a 
gap-filling Christian medical service (largely small town and rural 
in Ghana and - at least in contrast to the government service - 
Angola) is another option where relatively low resource allocation 
priority to health services and especially phc is parallel to general 
government and health service goodwill toward them, if someone else 
pays.
38. A special factor here is the impact of not charging fees on external 
support for health services. It has been suggested that revolving 
drug funds (in general and in the Bamako context) are a device to 
lessen donor wariness for financing recurrent costs by seeming to 
provide a terminal date for such support and not a serious revenue 
raising gambit. As a general proposition that appears rather too 
Machiavellian (in either the colloquial or the technical sense of the 
term). But it is true that some fee systems (or increases) have been 
negotiated in large part because World Bank funding or mobilisation 
of bilateral funding for recurrent health services costs was 
essential and could not be secured without such changes in charging. 
That is not a normative comment on either party to such negotiations
- the Bank believes in the usefulness and equitability of charges; 
the African negotiators perceived additional foreign exchange support 
for health services as essential to having worthwhile services 
accessible to larger numbers.
39. Indeed it has not tackled the issue of what is meant by community.
In some countries (e.g. Tanzania) a village or other unit reasonably 
definable as a community is the base level administrative, political 
and/or local governmental unit. In others (e.g. Mozambique) 
districts with average populations over 100,000 form that base tier 
and are clearly not communities in the sense either of the Bamako 
Declaration or of this paper. Decentralisation to district level 
should pose fewer problems in administrative principle or practice, 
because most districts (sometimes excluding major cities) are 
basically Central Government staffed and financed with or without
gelected local quasi-supervisory and consultative bodies whatever the 
formal status of local government. So long as a District is much 
larger than a community, the problems of resource mobilisation/fee 
collection are likely to be more analogous to those of the Central 
Government than of an organic community.
40. In respect to user charges the author has grave doubts that 
equitable, collection cost efficient, non-access denying, 
administrable central government fee systems which yield significant 
revenues can be devised and operated. A serious attempt in relation 
to drugs in Mozambique yields 4% to 5% collection relative to drug 
costs, chaotic problems of exemption and collection (not excluding 
corruption) and not insignificant loss of access by persons who 
cannot pay and believe (perhaps wrongly) they would have to do so. 
There are some exceptions, e.g. above basic level "hotel" (room and 
board) services which should be charged at full cost, but these are 
usually peripheral both as to services and revenues. User 
contributions based on the insurance principle are somewhat more 
promising. Assuming equity/equal effort are valid principles they 
should be at least somewhat progressive. Because only 5% to 20% of 
households in most SSA countries have incomes high enough for an 
income tax to be cost efficient a surcharge on or tax parallel to and 
collected with income tax would have a narrow base. A practicable 
option might be indirect taxes (tax increases) on products 
detrimental to health, e.g. cigarettes, cigars, pipe tobacco, beer, 
wine, spirits, saloon cars, motorcycles, cosmetics and medically 
useless patent medicines and tonics. These are - as a group - a 
rising proportion of household spending up to the top 1% to 3% of the 
income distribution.
41. This conclusion on general lack of attention is based on a probably 
non-random sample but includes national (especially Ghana and 
Mozambique), UNICEF and World Bank studies as well as the papers 
presented to the 1989 "Health for All in the Year 2000" international 
conference at the University of Washington co-sponsored by WHO and 
UNICEF.
42. Better (as to relevance and quality) training restoration of real 
wages and salaries to living levels, re-establishment of procedural 
and presence regulations (and sanctions for violating them) are 
aspects of bureaucratic system rehabilitation which, unlike the 
issues posed here, are fairly generally identified and valid in 
themselves whatever else may be needed.
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